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Abstract
This study examines the fungibility of foreign aid and makes three contributions to
the existing literature. Firstly, fungibility of aid at the aggregate level is reexamined
on a richer panel dataset of 91 developing countries for 1980-2009, taking into account
endogeneity of aid and autocorrelation in residuals. Results indicate that aid is strongly
fungible: around 80 % is substituting rather than increasing government spending in the
short run. There is also substantial heterogeneity in the sample, with aid being more
fungible for countries with a low share of aid in GDP. Secondly, aid is disaggregated
into bilateral and multilateral components. Despite substantial differences between both
components, there are only very small indications that multilateral aid is less fungible
than bilateral aid and estimates are volatile when aid is instrumented. Thirdly, this
study attempts to distinguish between off- and on-budget aid at the aggregate level us-
ing the value of technical cooperation as a proxy for off-budget aid. While on-budget
aid is strongly fungible, off-budget aid is non-fungible. In the long run, around 50 % of
aid increases government expenditures, although results are not stable. High levels of
fungibility (except for off-budget aid) suggest that resources spent on earmarking may
be wasted and donors should rethink the way aid is distributed.
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conference for useful comments, and to Lisette Swart, Melinda Vigh, Jannis Visser and Marcin Zamojski for
other help. The usual disclaimers apply.
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1 Introduction
Over the last 30 years aid has accounted for around 9% of developing countries’ GDP1
and has been one of the main sources of government revenues in those countries. Empirical
literature has been trying (especially from the mid 1990’s) to quantify aid’s impact on growth
and well-being in developing countries. However, results have been mixed (for reviews and
discussion see, for example, Tarp 2006; Roodman 2007; Arndt et al. 2010). One of the factors
that may explain the lower impact of aid on growth (than expected in the 1970’s or 1980’s)
is fungibility.
Fungibility occurs when recipients respond to aid by changing the way they use their
own resources. When one euro of aid ends up financing (on the margin) provision of services
or goods other than intended, aid is said to be fungible.2 On the aggregate level, aid is
fungible when one euro of aid increases government expenditure by less than one euro, and
fully fungible when government spending does not rise at all. It can happen for at least two
reasons: (i) aid substitutes rather than complements the budget, therefore the government
is able to decrease taxes, decrease borrowing needs or increase surplus (which may result in
lower taxes in the future), (ii) aid is stolen and ends up in private pockets. Thus, if aid is
fungible on the macro level, it finances on the margin private consumption and savings via
taxes or corruption.
One of the main reasons of fungibility are the differences in preferences between donors
and recipients. Donors may favor different regions or sectors than recipients, and in response
recipient’s government may shift its own expenditures to other regions or sectors, or limit
total government’s spending, favoring private consumption. In the latter case, fungibility at
the aggregate level will be recorded.
Fungibility is more likely when monitoring the actual disbursement of aid is costly (Chat-
terjee et al., 2007). As Feyzioglu et al. (1998) suggest, it may seem that avoiding fungibility
should be easy from a donor’s perspective. Donors usually impose strict and carefully chosen
conditions and a large part of aid is earmarked. Additionally, pre-intervention levels of gov-
ernment spending in aid-recipient countries are usually available to donors and those could
1My own calculations of unweighted average for a sample of 91 countries (details in data section). When
countries are weighted by the size of economy (GDP) average drops to 0.98%, driven by China (0.11%) and
India (0.38%), and to 2.18% if those two countries are excluded.
2A theoretical discussion of fungibility is presented in McGillivray & Morrissey (2000, 2001b).
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be used as an imperfect measure of what would happen if a particular aid package was not
given. However, there are cases when this kind of monitoring is difficult. Usually countries
receive aid from multiple sources and donor coordination is still poor. At the same time, in
developing nations, domestic resources fluctuate significantly within short periods of time
and therefore past spending (and especially its composition) may not be informative.
Summing up, high donor monitoring costs and different preferences may cause govern-
ments to use diversion of funds as a way to limit the effect of diminishing returns to govern-
ment spending, both at the aggregate level and in specific sectors.
The arguments presented above suggest that aid is expected to be partially fungible. This
prediction is confirmed in simple theoretical models. Assume that if aid is not given, national
income y is equal to GDP and equals sum of consumption c and government expenditures g :
GDP = y = c+ g. When aid arrives and is channeled through the budget, national income
increases by amount of aid a and equals y = c+ g+ a while GDP remains constant, since it
is balanced by increased import or financial flows. In most (dynamic) models it is optimal
to increase both current and future consumption in response to an increase in income due to
consumption smoothing. If agents have homothetic preferences for private and merit goods,
an increase in income will be divided so that the shares of consumption and government
spending remain constant. In table 2 in the data section share of government expenditures
in GDP equals around 21-25% which means that, if the simple theoretical models are correct,
one euro of aid should increase government expenditures by around 21-25 cents while the
rest will substitute for government spending.
Aid fungibility is not necessarily a bad thing for development. On the aggregate level,
when aid substitutes rather than increases government spending, it potentially reduces tax
levels. Tax relief may have a very high rate of return (at least in the short run) because in
most developing countries distortions caused by taxes are very high (Devarajan et al., 1999;
Feyzioglu et al., 1998).3 Increases in private consumption or investment (even over a short
period of time) may also have a very beneficial impact on lives of people around the poverty
line (where returns to consumption are high).4 On the sectoral, regional or micro level, funds
3Conversely, it may also have negative macroeconomic consequences due to the fact that aid is more volatile
and unpredictable than national revenues. Increasing aid dependence reduces incentives for governments to
introduce good policies and efficient institutions. Moreover, tax exemptions may be granted only to interest
groups (Pivovarsky et al., 2003).
4Of course, whether it is the most efficient use of resources, is a relevant question.
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may be reallocated to more productive investments. Furthermore, there is potential value
for a country to make its own spending decisions.
What are the consequences of fungibility? When fungibility is present, assessing the effects
of aid is more difficult. On the macro level, aid’s impact is the sum of the impact of
increased spending as well as the impact of increased private consumption and savings (due
to a tax decrease or corruption). What is more, if aid is fungible at the aggregate level
it finances projects that would have been undertaken anyway which rises question about
wasted money spent on earmarking. As a solution, Devarajan & Swaroop (1998) suggest to
use direct budgetary support conditional on an agreement about composition and quality of
government spending instead of directly financing chosen sectors or regions. Both arguments
suggest that measuring and understating fungibility is important for donor strategies and
may lead to more cost-efficient ways of aid distribution.
There is consensus neither about the extent of fungibility, nor about its importance. The
first contribution of this study is to provide additional evidence on cross-country fungibility.
I test the hypothesis that aggregated aid flows are fungible using a rich dataset of 91 countries
in 1980-2009 and accounting for the endogeneity of aid and the autocorrelation of residuals
in the model. Aid is often determined at the same time as government expenditures and it
may also be channeled to countries that fail to provide merit goods. In both cases, aid will be
endogenous. What is more, public expenditures may be persistent and that should be taken
into account to get a consistent estimate of the impact of aid on government expenditure.
Arellano-Bond’s (1991) system estimator is used to address the problems of endogeneity and
dynamic misspecification of the model.
Fungibility of aid has been tested on aggregate, sectoral and regional level. Aid can
also be disaggregated into bilateral and multilateral aid, and to my knowledge no one has
tested fungibility of these major components. Ram (2003) points out that bilateral and
multilateral aid differ at least for three reasons: (i) donor motives, (ii) aid conditionalities
and (iii) closeness of the relationship between the donor and the recipient. Furthermore,
Ram (2003, 2004) showed that bilateral aid has a significantly different impact on growth
than multilateral aid does, hence assuming equality of coefficients may not be appropriate
also in fungibility analysis. This study attempts to fill this gap.
Whenever a part of aid is not recorded in the budget and the distinction between off- and
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on-budget aid is not accounted for, fungibility estimates will be biased. Van de Sijpe (2010)
made the first attempt at distinguishing between recorded (on-budget) and unrecorded (off-
budget) aid flows at the sectoral level. I follow his approach at the aggregate level and try
to estimate the fungibility of on- and off-budget aid.
Differences in fungibility of bilateral and multilateral aid, as well as off- and on-budget
aid, may have policy implications if recipients are reluctant to cooperate with donors on the
division of total government spending or donors do not trust budget support. If donors want
to avoid fungibility, they may use less fungible types of aid.
While the focus of this study is on the response of government expenditures to aid in
given year (similarly to the literature), inclusion of the lag dependent variable allows also to
estimate long term fungibility.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents a literature review, the third
section describes the data, the fourth focuses on methodology, the fifth discusses the choice
of controls. Afterwards, results for the aggregate aid are presented. Seventh section discusses
and presents results for bilateral and multilateral aid, and eight for off- and on-budget aid.
Robustness of the results is tested in Section 9. The study ends with conclusions.
2 Literature review
As noted before, there is no consensus about the importance and extent of fungibility. Pack &
Pack (1990) find that foreign aid does not replace government expenditures in Indonesia, but
it even stimulates further spending. The same authors show that in the Dominican Republic
development expenditures are used to finance deficit reduction, debt service and taxes, and
as a result aid is highly fungible (Pack & Pack, 1993). Swaroop et al. (2000) report that
aid in India is financing projects that would have been undertaken anyway, and the freed
resources are spent on non-development purposes. On the aggregate level, Feyzioglu et al.
(1998) report that for their basic sample of 14 countries aid is not fungible at the aggregate
level, and that there is no tax relief that could be associated with fungibility. However,
this result suffers greatly from sample selection problems, as when the number of countries
is increased, aid appears to be fungible.5 Devarajan et al. (1999) find that each dollar of
5McGillivray & Morrissey (2000) point out concerns about this study.
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aid leads to a 90 cent increase in government expenditures in a sample of 18 Sub-Saharan
countries in 1971-1995, so only little fungibility is present. Pivovarsky et al. (2003) find
(sample of 107 countries in 1970-2000) that concessional loans increase domestic revenue,
whereas grants are fungible. Chatterjee et al. (2007) for a panel of 67 countries in 1972-2000
find that 70% of aid is fungible at the aggregate level. They suggest that since there is no
significant effect of foreign aid on growth in the presence of fungibility, fungibility can be
the missing link that explains the mixed results of growth regressions. A wide review of
the fiscal effects of aid (in particular fungibility and fiscal response studies) is provided by
McGillivray & Morrissey (2001b).
Another question debated in the literature is whether aid earmarked to one sector is
financing expenditures also in other sectors. For example, Feyzioglu et al. (1998) find that
concessional loans going to agriculture, education and energy are fungible, while those to the
transport and communication sectors are spent according to the donor’s wishes. Devarajan
et al. (1999) show that aid going to the transport and communication sector and the energy
sector is fungible, and that for the agriculture, health, and industry sectors the hypothesis
of full fungibility cannot be rejected. Pettersson (2007a) finds that over 70% of sectoral aid
is fungible. Conversely, Van de Sijpe (2010), using data that distinguishes between off- and
on-budget aid, shows that off-budget aid (approximated by technical cooperation) has a very
small impact on government expenditures in health and education sectors, while results for
on-budget aid (approximated by a sector programme) are mixed and no firm conclusion can
be drawn.
Aid may have indirect effects on government spending. For example, investments in
bed nets may result in decreased malaria morbidity and, in the long term, decreased health
spending. However, the focus of (almost) the whole fungibility literature is on short term
impact of aid on government expenditures. What is tested is whether aid disbursed in a given
year is increasing government expenditures in the same year. This study also focuses on the
short term fungibility, however thanks to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable I
attempt to investigate also medium or long term fungibility.
To my knowledge, the fungibility of aid disaggregation into bilateral and multilateral
components has not been tested. This study aims at filling this gap. Additionally, following
Van de Sijpe (2010) who analysed separately off- and on-budget aid, I include off-budget aid
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into the analysis.
3 Data
The analysis was initially limited to 49 Least Developed Countries and 12 Other Low Income
Countries (both described as LDCs afterwards) and 49 Lower and Middle Income Countries
and Territories (LMICs). Countries were classified according to the ‘DAC (the Development
Assistance Committee) List of ODA Recipients’ for 2009 and 2010 from the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (see Appendix A for definitions of
the main concepts used in this paper, Appendix C for the list of countries). For 19 countries
there are missing observations for either the dependent variable or controls for all years,
therefore those countries are excluded so that the final sample consists of 91 countries. The
data covers the period 1980-2009.
Out of the 91 countries, the majority comes from Africa (44) and Asia (26) (see Table
1). Of 51 LDCs, 35 come from Africa. All countries from Latin America and Europe are in
the group of Lower and Middle Income Countries and Territories.
Table 1: Countries by continent and income group
All countries Africa Asia Europe Oceania Latin America
LDC 51 35 12 0 4 0
LMIC 40 9 14 5 1 11
All 91 44 26 5 5 11
The data and sources are described in more detail in Appendix B. In general, the variables
used in this study can be divided into three classes: a public spending variable, an aid
variable, and a set of control variables.
The dependent variable is total government spending as a share of GDP from the In-
ternational Monetary Fund’s (IMF) World Economic Outlook (WEO). There are plenty of
missing observations in the 1980’s, but from 1990 onwards the data are relatively complete
for most countries. On average, a country included in the sample has 16.5 observations of
government expenditures and a median country has 15.
Among the independent variables, of main interest is the Official Development Assistance
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(ODA). The data for aggregate aid disbursements, as well as for bilateral aid, multilateral aid,
non-DAC aid and technical cooperation (all in current dollars) come from the Development
Assistance Committee of the OECD (DAC2a Table6). All aid variables are expressed as a
share of the aid-recipient’s GDP, where GDP (in current dollars) is taken from IMF’s WEO.
The data on disbursements are complete and, for almost all countries, cover the years 1980-
2009. Regarding the control variables used in this study, the majority of them come from
Table 2: Unweighted (Un) and weighted (W) share of government expenditures and aid for
various groups of countries
Gov. exp. Aid in Bil aid Mul aid
in GDP(%) GDP (%) in GDP (%) in GDP(%)
Un W Un W Un W Un W
All 26.32 21.59 9.62 0.98 5.74 0.62 3.56 0.34
LDCs 25.71 22.18 12.81 5.39 7.53 3.22 4.98 2.11
LMICs 27.15 21.52 4.87 0.44 3.08 0.30 1.46 0.13
Africa 25.72 27.73 12.35 4.52 7.17 2.81 4.88 1.65
Asia 26.13 20.43 5.38 0.47 3.09 0.29 1.82 0.17
Europe 39.05 41.04 6.97 1.82 3.90 1.05 2.82 0.71
Oceania 29.66 31.22 15.80 8.95 12.29 7.66 3.40 1.26
Latin America 23.07 22.09 4.46 1.10 3.00 0.83 1.45 0.27
1980-1989 27.09 22.25 10.17 1.19 5.87 0.74 3.40 0.43
1990-1999 26.27 19.95 10.21 1.19 6.19 0.75 3.87 0.42
2000-2009 26.21 22.23 8.76 0.86 5.28 0.55 3.40 0.31
China 19.53 18.75 0.23 0.11 0.15 0.08 0.07 0.04
India* 24.60 24.78 0.44 0.38 0.24 0.20 0.20 0.18
Source: own calculations based on IMF and OECD data
* data cover 1980-2006
the World Development Indicators (WDI): i.e. agricultural value added as a share of the
aid-recipient’s GDP, annual growth of GDP(%), GDP per capita in constant dollars (PPP),
literacy rate, annual population growth(%), population and a trade variable (sum of exports
and imports of goods and services as a share of GDP). Furthermore, the annual inflation
rate (%) is obtained from the WEO and finally, U.S. Census Bureau’s international database
(IDB) provides the data on infant mortality rates.
Table 2 reports the means of the variables of main interest. The unweighted share of
6Available at http://stats.oecd.org/ under Development → Other
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government expenditures in GDP is similar among all groups (with the exception of the
5 European countries) and constant over time. As expected, Least Developed countries
receive almost 13% of their GDP in the form of aid, which is 2.6 times as much as LMICs.
Furthermore, since the majority of LDCs are located in Africa, this is also the continent with
the highest average share of aid in GDP. Around 60% of aid is received from bilateral DAC
donors, 37% from multilateral organizations and the rest from non-DAC donors.7 Oceania
receives relatively more aid from bilateral donors (82%) than the average in the sample,
patterns for other continents are close to the whole sample.
Unweighted averages do not account for the fact that the biggest (both in terms of
population and size of economy) countries receive less per capita aid. For example, India’s
share of aid surpassed 1% of GDP only in the early 1980s, while for China the highest share
was in 1992 and equaled 0.6%. Right columns in Table 2 presents calculations weighted
by total GDP. When the size of countries is taken into account, aid accounts for 0.98%
of aid-recipients’ GDP (and for 2.18% if China and India are excluded). The difference
between LDCs and LMICs is even more significant: aid constitutes more than 5.39% of
GDP in Least Developed Countries, which is more than 10 times as much as the percentage
it constitutes in Lower and Middle Income Countries (which include China and India). In
addition, differences between continents are substantial: Europe, South America and Asia –
continents with almost exclusively LMICs – have low shares of aid in GDP, whereas Africa
– that groups the majority of LDCs – and Oceania relatively high. To account for different
patterns of the distribution of aid with respect to size of the country, regression weighted by
population will be analyzed as a robustness check.
4 Methodology and model predictions
The following section presents the model used to evaluate the extent of fungibility of aggre-
gated aid and aid disaggregated to bilateral and multilateral components.
7Due to the uncertainty about the quality of data from non-DAC donors aid from that group is not
included as a separate component when aid is disaggregated. See appendix B for details and discussion.
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4.1 Fixed effects model
Firstly, following the approach used most widely in the literature, a model with fixed effects
for country and year is estimated. Additionally, pooled OLS model with the time fixed
effects is included. For the aggregate aid equation, those models are of the form:
(1) GovExpit = αAIDit + βXit + γt + (δi) + εit
where GovExpit represents the share of government expenditures in GDP, AIDit the share
of ODA in GDP. Xit is a set of controls, γt is year fixed effects and δi represents recipient’s
country fixed effects (only for country fixed effects model). εit is an error term. Subscript ‘i ’
refers to a country and ‘t ’ to time. In this model, α is the coefficient of main interest: if the
estimated α is equal to 1, aid is non-fungible. An estimated α less than 1 but greater than
0 means that aid is partially fungible and α equal to 0 indicates that aid is fully fungible.
Finally, an estimated α bigger than 1 provides evidence for the so-called ”flypaper effect”, the
situation in which one euro of aid leads to a more than proportional increase in government
expenditures.8.
For aid disaggregated into a bilateral and a multilateral component, the equations to be
estimated change to:
(2) GovExpit = αbBIL AIDit + αmMUL AIDit + βXit + γt + (δi) + εit
where BIL AIDit and MUL AIDit are the shares of bilateral and multilateral aid from
DAC donors in aid-recipient’s GDP. Interpretation of the coefficients of main interest, which
are αb and αm, is the same as for aggregated aid.
Bertrand et al. (2004) point out that in panel data, outcomes are serially correlated
which is often ignored by researchers. When serial correlation in errors is not accounted for,
standard errors are underestimated and the null hypothesis that there is no effect is rejected
too frequently. Following Van de Sijpe (2010), I apply a Wald test to check for serial
8 The ‘flypaper effect’ is a tendency of resources coming from higher levels of government to ‘stick where
it hits’, and not be passed on as tax relief (Hines & Thaler, 1995) This effect is associated with increased
government spending, i.e. with tax or borrowing increases.McGillivray & Morrissey (2001a) offer 5 scenar-
ios where the inflow of aid leads to greater than proportional increases in public expenditures in recipient
countries.
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correlation of errors in the linear panel-data model. The null hypothesis of no correlation
is equivalent to the residuals having −0.5 autocorrelation in the first difference model. For
all specifications, the hypothesis of no serial correlation is rejected. Results are confirmed
by Arellano-Bond’s (1991) autocorrelation test. Bertrand et al. (2004) suggest, on the basis
of Monte Carlo simulations, as a solution to this problem to estimate a variance-covariance
matrix which is consistent in the presence of any autocorrelation. Furthermore, it is noted
that this solution works well when the number of groups is sufficiently large, which is the
case in this sample consisting of 91 countries. Therefore, to account for autocorrelation I
include the Newey-West correction of standard errors which is an estimator satisfying the
criteria mentioned above. Additionally, this estimator is robust to heteroscedasticity.
4.2 Dynamic panel model
Van de Sijpe (2010) points out that the presence of serial correlation may indicate that the
model is dynamically misspecified. A second indication that the model may be dynamically
misspecified comes from the comparison of fixed effects estimates (within-estimator) and
the first difference (FD) model. Results of estimates for variables of the main interest are
presented in Table 3. Both for aggregated aid and aid disaggregated into components first
difference estimates are smaller than fixed effects and this difference may suggest violation
of the strict exogeneity assumption. Then, as a result, both FD and FE estimates would be
inconsistent and have different probability limits.
Both findings suggest that there may be some dynamics in the determination of public
expenditures and spending are likely to be persistent. Indeed, the correlation of current and
lagged values of government expenditures is very high and equals 70% when fixed effects are
accounted for. Inclusion of the lagged dependent variable may solve the problem and remove
autocorrelation in errors.
Roodman (2006) points out that when the number of periods is large, dynamic panel
bias becomes insignificant and a more straightforward fixed effects estimator works (that
requires fewer assumptions and the results of which are less sensitive to the researcher’s
choices). Therefore, in addition to a standard fixed effects model presented in the previous
section also a fixed effects model with a lagged dependent variable will be used (as well as,
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Table 3: Fixed effects results (FE) compared to first difference OLS (FD OLS)
FE FD OLS FE FD OLS FE FD OLS
Aid 0.225*** 0.081*
(0.06) (0.03)
Bil Aid 0.183 0.06
(0.10) (0.04)
Mul Aid 0.299* 0.143*
(0.15) (0.06)
Off-budget aid 0.520*** 0.226
(0.07) (0.12)
On-budget aid 0.181*** 0.076*
(0.02) (0.03)
FD denotes first difference model estimated by OLS (with difference year effects included). Dependent
variable is the share of government expenditures in GDP(%) (or difference of it). Fixed country and year
effects included, not presented. The same coefficients as in the result section used, not presented. Newey-West
correction of standard errors used, presented in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
for comparison, pooled OLS). For the aggregate aid equation, those models are of the form:
(3) GovExpit = ρGovExpit−1 + αAIDit + βXit + γt + (δi) + εit
And for disaggregated aid:
(4) GovExpit = ρGovExpit−1 + αbBIL AIDit + αmMUL AIDit + βXit + γt + (δi) + εit
Endogeneity of aid allocation and disbursement is another problem that has been ignored
in many studies on the fungibility of foreign aid. Donors may focus on the provision of merit
goods in countries that fail to provide them. Then, aid flows may be connected to poor
institutional quality and bad policies. Furthermore, as Tamura (2005) argues, recipient
countries may develop the trait of aid dependency, and additionally due to poor economic
performance and weak institutions may have lower preferences for goods that are associated
with economic growth. Those preferences are correlated with aid received but at the same
time unobserved or impossible to measure. If they change over time or change with the level
of aid, fixed effects will be insufficient to account for them.
McGillivray & Morrissey (2000) suggest that often the recipient can decide on the timing
of aid disbursement. This means that aid inflow may be determined simultaneously with
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the level of government expenditures, which clearly leads to endogeneity. Additionally,
Pettersson (2007b) argues that endogeneity may arise also due to the fact that countries
with good policies may be allowed to treat part of its aid as fungible.
Problems of endogeneity and potential dynamic misspecification of the model are ad-
dressed by Arellano-Bond’s difference and system GMM. Dynamic panel estimators allow
the left hand side variable to be dynamic and dependent on past realizations, and they allow
independent variables that are correlated with past and current realizations of the error (so
variables that are not strictly exogenous), and allow heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
within individuals but not across them (Roodman, 2006). It allows estimation of models (3)
and (4).
As suggested by Roodman (2006), to account for autocorrelation across individuals,
time dummies are included (and they are treated as strictly exogenous variables, hence are
included as additional instruments). All lagged variables are predetermined. Lagged aid and
growth are included to instrument current aid and growth levels (the only two independent
variables that are not lagged).
Panel data provide a large number of instruments that can be used in a GMM framework
(Arellano & Bond, 1991). For difference GMM, lags of dependent variables can be used
as instruments; system GMM adds additional moment conditions instrumenting the level
equation with differences under the assumption of stationarity.
Roodman (2006) points out that the number of instruments increases quadratically in
the time dimension, therefore for long panels there is a risk of overfitting which also weakens
Hansen test. However, there is no consensus on what number of instruments brings overi-
dentification, Roodman notes that the threshold of 100 implemented in Stata is generous. A
first attempt to bring down the number of instruments is to collapse or limit the number of
lags that can be used as instruments.9 Each method makes the instrument count linear in
time dimension, which brings down instrument count to at least 64 instruments (29 for each
time dummy, 29 for collapsed or lag limited instrument set and 6 for independent variables).
As for example Windmeijer (2005) shows, given the number of time periods and panels re-
sults may still be biased. In Monte Carlo tests of difference GMM, Mehrhoff (2009) shows
that GMM estimator with the instrument set being both collapsed and limited, has both
9For reference see Roodman (2006, 2009).
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a lower bias and a lower root mean squared error compared to the unrestricted instrument
set, collapsed instrument set or lagged limited instrument set. This makes also the instru-
ment count invariant in the number of time periods and solves the problem of too many
instruments. I follow this approach in my analysis which limits the number of instruments
to around 40. Thus, Hansen test of overidentification restriction is more reliable.
There is no straightforward way to choose between Arellano-Bond’s difference estimator
or system estimator. As Van de Sijpe (2010) notes, in the difference GMM weak instruments
problem may be present if lagged values are for example persistent over time, which in turn
may lead to a bias. Then additional equations in levels for the system estimator may
overcome the problem. Also, in all specifications, coefficients of both the variables of main
interest and other controls are relatively stable for the system estimator, when different
lags are used, but not for the difference estimator. In all specifications, the coefficient of
the lagged dependent variable is smaller than one which does not raise concerns regarding
stationarity (although this assumption cannot be tested). Therefore, system GMM estimator
is used.
Inclusion of the lagged dependent variable not only solves dynamic misidentification prob-
lem, but allows also to estimate long-run effect of foreign aid on government expenditures.
It also changes the way fungibility coefficients should be analyzed. α estimates now short
term effect of aid on government expenditures, whereas long-run effect can be derived from
αLR = α/(1− ρ).10
5 Controls
For the set of controls I am looking for variables that may explain the size of government
expenditures, and hence make an estimate of the main interest variable more precise, and/or
variables that are correlated with aid and cause estimates to be biased when excluded.
Following Feyzioglu et al. (1998); Pivovarsky et al. (2003) and Chatterjee et al. (2007)
controls that account for government expenditures in some sectors are tested. Agricultural
10This is a first step to estimate long-run fungibility. In the further step, which will be the topic of my
next study, long term fungibility can be analyzed using 4 or 5 year average of data, similarly to the parallel
literature on the impact of aid on growth. That may be a superior method to estimate medium and long
term fungibility.
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value-added is used to control for spending in the agriculture sector and, additionally, for
the level of development. Literacy rate controls for spending in education sectors. Infant
mortality rate, population growth and dependency ratio serve as proxies for health-care and
social security spending.
Chatterjee et al. (2007) suggest that real per capita GDP proxies for income, and thus
can be used to control for the size of the government. Feyzioglu et al. (1998) refer to
Wagner’s law which states that development is accompanied by an increase of share of
government expenditures in GDP. Moreover, according to Van de Sijpe (2010) aid expressed
as a share of GDP is very likely to be correlated with GDP per capita. In my sample the
correlation between GDP per capita and the share of aid in GDP is rather small, hence the
risk of spurious regression, when GDP per capita is not controlled for, is relatively small.
Therefore, the latter argument is less valid. Additionally, Feyzioglu et al. (1998) point out
that per capita GDP is correlated with the share of agriculture in GDP, infant mortality
rate and school enrollment (so also with literacy rate). As a result the estimated coefficients
of the latter variables may be affected if GDP per capita is not controlled for.
The growth variable should control for the response of government spending to short-run
shocks in GDP per capita (Van de Sijpe, 2010). As has been noted before, McGillivray
& Morrissey (2000) suggest that recipients tend to have a large freedom of choice over
the extent to which committed aid is disbursed in a a single year. Hence, any shock to
expenditures would also affect the amount of aid disbursed, and aid would be correlated
with the error term. Therefore, the growth rate should serve as a proxy for shocks to
government expenditures.
A ratio of a sum of imports and exports to GDP (described as trade) is used to capture
the effect of openness of the economy on government expenditures. Rodrik (1996) shows that
the size of government has been larger in the most open economies due to the risk of shocks
of external origin. Alesina & Wacziarg (1998) argue that this positive correlation is rather
due to the country size, since trade openness and government expenditures are negatively
correlated with the share of public consumption in GDP. This result was questioned recently
by Ram (2009) who using fixed-effects format to account for cross-country heterogeneity
that was not taken into account by Alesina & Wacziarg (1998) suggests that Rodrik’s (1996)
explanation may be the correct one.
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Population accounts for the fact that bigger countries receive less aid per capita and
usually also less aid in relation to GDP. The inflation rate is included as a factor that
has been found to be significantly related to cross-country variations in domestic revenues
(Pivovarsky et al., 2003).
Other controls include fixed effects that account for time-invariant factors like geography,
colonial history or legal origin. Additionally, fixed effects should account for differences in
reporting scopes of government expenditures (if reporting quality is constant over time).
Year fixed effects are used to control for events that had an impact on all recipients in a
given year.
Undoubtedly, aid may have impact on some of the control variables. For example, aid
to the health sector may decrease infant mortality rate, aid financing educational projects
may increase literacy rate. To account for potential simultaneity problems, lagged values
of controls are used. The only exception is made for growth of GDP since it accounts for
immediate responses of government expenditures to shocks and the lagged growth variable
(although correlated at 46%) is not good enough as a proxy.
The controls presented above were tested in various configurations, both for aggregated
and for disaggregated aid. Population, annual population growth, GDP per capita in con-
stant USD and dependency ratio were found to be statistically insignificant (at a 5% signifi-
cance level) and they did not affect the estimate of interest nor the precision of the estimates,
therefore they are excluded from the remainder of this analysis.11 The literacy rate among
adults affects results. However, this is likely caused by the fact that for many countries
this rate is constant over time (increases slightly over decades). When the literacy rate is
not controlled for, it is captured by fixed effects, which causes it to be highly collinear with
the recipient’s fixed effects (VIF equals 270) and therefore the literacy rate should not be
included as a regressor.
In the end, five variables are used as controls – annual GDP growth (in %) (denoted GDP
growth), lagged annual inflation rate (L.Infl), lagged agricultural value added as a share of
GDP (L.Agr VA), lagged sum of imports and exports of goods and services as share of GDP
11Additionally, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for projection of dependency ratio on the other variables
equals 49, which is above usually assumed cut off values proposed in the literature (5 or 10), therefore the
dependency ratio should not be included as a regressor. Multicollinearity is discussed further in the robustness
section.
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(L. Trade), and lagged infant mortality rate per 1000 births (L.IMR). Those controls are
plugged into equations (1)-(4) to answer the following research questions: are aggregated
and disaggregated aid fungible and what is the fungibility of off- and on-budget aid?
6 Aggregated aid
In the first stage of the analysis it is tested whether aggregated aid is fungible. As noted
before, an estimated coefficient of the share of aid smaller than 1 means that aid is fungible
(fully fungible when 0), so that part of the aid is either financing tax reductions (or decreasing
borrowing needs, or increasing surplus) or that it is stolen.12 As can be seen from Table 4, in
the basic fixed effects specification used in other fungibility studies fungibility of aggregated
aid is high for the sample of all countries and equals around 0.78, which means that when
the share of aid in GDP increases by 1 percentage point (pp) government expenditures as
share of GDP increase by around 0.22 pp and the remaining 0.78 pp substitute expenditures,
are used to decrease taxes, borrowing needs, or it is stolen in given year. Compared to the
pooled OLS model, fixed effect estimate is smaller.
However, Arellano-Bond’s test of autocorrelation rejects the null hypothesis of no au-
tocorrelation for both models, which means that Newey-West standard errors do not solve
that problem and there may still be dynamic misspecification. As expected, including lagged
dependent variable solves the autocorrelation problem - both the test for first and for second
order serial correlation fail to reject the null of no autocorrelation in all three specifications
with the lagged dependent variable.13 As has been noted before, even when strict exogeneity
is violated due to the inclusion of lagged dependent variable, for a long panel dynamic bias
becomes insignificant and the fixed effects estimator can be used.
When lagged dependent variable is included, short term fungibility is underestimated by
pooled OLS model compared to preferred fixed effects and Arellano-Bond’s estimates. For
fixed effects model, around 87% of aid is fungible when endogeneity of aid is not taken into
12As will be argued later, estimates may suggest fungibility due to the fact that not all aid is recorded in
the budget. When off-budget aid is not properly accounted for, fungibility results may be biased.
13Please note that for equations in levels (so for fixed effects and IV regressions) Arellano-Bond test checks
average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 (for ABAR(1)) or 2 (for ABAR(2)) is 0. If the test fails to reject
the null, there are no sign of autocorrelation. However, for the system GMM estimator due to differencing
ABAR(1) should be rejected when there is no autocorrelation.
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Table 4: Results for aggregated aid
Pooled OLS FE Pooled OLS FE GMM
Aid 0.319*** 0.225*** 0.076*** 0.128*** 0.206*
(0.08) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.08)
L.Gov exp 0.876*** 0.625*** 0.627***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.15)
GDP growth -0.203** -0.170** -0.070* -0.114* -0.590
(0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.55)
L.Infl 0.007 -0.004 -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.008
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
L.IMR -0.030 0.055* -0.006 0.023* -0.004
(0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
L.Trade 0.078*** 0.026 0.011*** 0.014 0.039*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
L.Agr VA -0.199*** 0.049 -0.030** 0.021 -0.098*
(0.04) (0.07) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
Constant 26.245*** 47.141*** 5.071*** 17.540*** 10.933*
(1.82) (1.68) (0.72) (2.07) (4.59)
F-stat 4.86 127.57 233.97 530.54
Obs 1369 1369 1309 1309 1305
Nr of instr 36
ABAR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.290 0.340 0.030
ABAR(2) 0.00 0.00 0.610 0.440 0.460
Sargan p-val 0.87
Hansen p-val 0.93
β ≤ 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
β ≥ 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
βLR 0.61 0.34 0.55
Dependent variable is the share of government expenditures in GDP (%). Mean equals 26.33%. Aid describes
share of aid in GDP (%). Year fixed effects included in all models, country fixed effects in fixed effects and
GMM models, both not presented. Newey-West standard errors used for pooled OLS and fixed effects model,
presented in parentheses. Two-step GMM system estimator using Windmeijer’s(2005) correction. GMM-
style instrument set both collapsed and lag limited to one lag. Sargan p-val and Hansen p-val show p-value
of Sargan and Hansen’s J-test on instrument validity, AB AR(1) and AB AR(2) show p-values for Arellano
and Bond’s (1991) test of first- and second-order serial correlation in the differenced residuals. L. denotes
lagged variable. β ≤ 0 is p-value for the test of full fungibility, β ≥ 1 of no fungibility. βLR is the estimate
of long-term fungibility of aggregated aid. ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
account (4th column). For the system GMM, when lagged government expenditures are
instrumented with GMM-style instruments and aid is instrumented with lagged values of
aid, 80% of aid is fungible. However some significance is lost. Both the Sargan test (that is
robust to the number of instruments, but not robust to heteroscedasticity) and the Hansen
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Table 5: Results for subgroups
FE FE GMM FE FE GMM
Africa High Aid
Aid 0.199*** 0.114*** 0.241* Aid 0.205*** 0.140*** 0.263**
(0.05) (0.02) (0.10) (0.05) (0.02) (0.10)
L.Gov exp 0.618*** 0.576*** L.Gov exp 0.617*** 0.489**
(0.04) (0.15) (0.04) (0.17)
Asia Low aid
Aid 0.156 0.144 0.221 Aid 0.290* 0.054 0.138
(0.13) (0.08) (0.13) (0.12) (0.07) (0.16)
L.Gov exp 0.614*** 0.460** L.Gov exp 0.622*** 0.742**
(0.06) (0.15) (0.05) (0.28)
Latin America
Aid 0.169 0.219 -0.068
(0.10) (0.13) (0.09)
L.Gov exp 0.574*** 0.859***
(0.09) (0.13)
Dependent variable is the share of government expenditures in GDP (%). Mean equals 26.33%. Aid describes
share of aid in GDP (%). Fixed country and year effects included in all models, not presented. Newey-
West standard errors used for fixed effects model, presented in parentheses. The same controls as in all
specifications used, coefficients not presented. Number of observations for models with lagged dependent
variable. ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
test (that can be weakened by large number of instruments) do not raise concerns with
regard to instrument validity. Furthermore, in all models the estimate of the coefficient of
lagged dependent variable is similar and always statistically significant.
In the long run, fungibility is much smaller and around half of aid substitutes, rather
than increases government expenditures. However, estimates are not very precise.
Table 5 presents additional evidence on fungibility. Fungibility for countries in Africa,
Asia and Latin America is tested.14 The same level of fungibility as for the whole sample
is found among 44 African countries, whereas both for Asia and Latin America the null of
full fungibility cannot be rejected. In additional regressions (not presented), aid is partly
fungible for Least Developed Countries and for countries in Oceania, while the null of full
fungibility cannot be rejected for Lower and Middle Income Countries.
Table 2 in the data section show that groups of countries where the null of full fungibility
14There are only 5 countries from Europe and 5 from Oceania, therefore results for these continents are
not presented.
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cannot be rejected are characterized by low share of aid in GDP, whereas in countries with
higher share of aid in GDP (Africa, LDCs, Oceania) results are significantly different from
zero and only partial fungibility is recorded. To further test that result, for each country the
average share of aid in GDP was calculated. Then countries were divided into two groups:
those with an average share of aid below 9.81% (which is the mean of average share for all
countries) were labeled low aid countries, whereas those with a share of aid in GDP equal to
or above 9.81% as high aid countries. Results of the regression for both groups are presented
in the right part of Table 5 and confirm previous findings. For high share countries aid is
partly fungible, while for low share countries full fungibility cannot be rejected.15 What
can explain this finding? Holmqvist (2000) offers as a possible explanation the hypothesis
that when aid constitutes a large share of recipient’s budget, the donor’s priorities determine
budget decisions and the opportunities to divert aid are limited. While this is plausible at
the sectoral level, it seems to be unlikely on an aggregated scale. Countries receive aid from
a large number of donors and donor coordination is poor (Feyzioglu et al., 1998; McGillivray
& Morrissey, 2001a), hence it is difficult to prevent diversion of aid. It is more likely that
richer countries usually have better access to financial markets and better institutions, so
that tax incomes and borrowing conditions are more stable. As a result, full diversion of
relatively low inflows of aid (even if it is volatile) is possible. Conversely, poorer countries
not only experience high and often volatile inflows of aid, but have also limited access to
financial markets and tax revenues that are also often unstable. Hence diversion of funds is
less likely. Pettersson (2007b) examines country-specific sectoral fungibility for 57 countries
and finds that the level of aid in GDP is positively correlated with a measure of fungibility,
which suggests that the higher a country’s dependence on aid, the higher fungibility is. He
discusses three possible explanations. Countries that treat aid as fungible can use it badly,
therefore these countries will be in need of further aid (reverse causality). However, his
analysis does not support that explanation since he finds no evidence that fungible funds
work worse than non-fungible. Alternatively, if ‘trusted’ countries (with good policies) that
may be allowed to treat aid as fungible are also the ones with high shares of aid, then a
negative sign of the squared term is expected. Additionally, higher aid levels may also be
correlated with the number of donors, and since the coordination among different donors is
15When median share of aid (which is lower than the mean) is used the difference is even bigger.
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usually poor, monitoring capabilities of donors may actually decrease.16
Since cross-country fungibility has been tested before, the results presented above can be
compared to other studies. All studies listed below estimate equation 1 (with different set
of controls), so results should be compared to the first column of Table 4. Since the lagged
dependent variable is not included and the error structure is not modeled, it is very likely
that these studies suffer from autocorrelation problems.
Devarajan et al. (1999) finds for a small sample of 18 Sub-saharan countries in the period
1971-1995 that around 10% of aid is used as tax relief (or bypasses budget). Basic results of
Feyzioglu et al. (1998) confirm that result: on a sample of 14 countries in period 1970-1990
only 5% of aid is fungible. However, when the sample size is extended to 38 countries 67%
of aid is fungible. Feyzioglu et al. (1998) argue that this finding suggests that there is a
lot of heterogeneity depending on the sample which is consistent with the evidence on the
tax relief. This concept of heterogeneity in the data is confirmed in my analysis: fungibility
differs between groups of countries. It also shows that for fungibility analysis, it is important
to have a large sample that allows analysis on subsamples, and that special attention should
be paid to observations numerically distant from others.
The study that is closest to this study in terms of period of analysis, sample and esti-
mated equation is Chatterjee et al. (2007). They find that around 70% of aid is fungible (also
when aid is instrumented), which is lower than the numbers found in this study. Although
this difference is not statistically significant, there are a few reasons that can explain the
difference. Their sample includes countries that in 2009 are no longer listed as DAC recipi-
ents, for example Argentina, Brazil, Slovenia or Russia, and their sample covers the period
1972-2000. One of the reasons the 1970s are not included in the dataset used in this study
is that the data of this period, particularly on government expenditures, are highly incom-
plete (this is still the case for the 80s, although to a lesser extent). Indeed, their dataset is
strongly unbalanced since they have 620 observations out of a potential 1943 (for the present
16The finding that fungibility is lower for countries that receive relatively more aid raises the question
whether fungibility is a linear phenomenon. Pack & Pack (1993) suggest that fungibility may be inversely
related to the share of aid in government expenditures since large aid flows decrease monitoring costs. To test
that, I include squared aid as a regressor. For all specifications coefficient of squared aid is negative, however
always insignificant (results available upon request). Contrary to what Pack & Pack (1993) suggest, I do not
find evidence of non-linearity, and negative sign suggest that fungibility can be higher for high amounts of
aid.
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study, this ratio is 1412 to 2730). The authors use IMF’s Government Financial Statistics
to obtain data on government expenditures.17 Similar to my study, lagged infant mortality,
lagged agricultural value added and lagged trade are used as controls, but in addition the
authors also use the lagged literacy rate, dependency ratio and real GDP per capita (which is
non-stationary). As has been argued in Section 5, the first two variables are relatively stable
over time and therefore strongly multicollinear with country-fixed effects. This may lead to
unstable coefficient estimates and a high risk of overfitting, and it may also explain a very
high adjusted R2 statistic of 0.90. When I run the regression with the same independent
variable on my sample the R2 increases to over 0.7 and only 13% of aid is fungible. This is
a highly unlikely result given the theoretical consideration and the fact that part of aid may
not be recorded in the budget.
To sum up, fungibility at the aggregate level has been reexamined on a rich panel of
91 countries for 30 year. Results from a fixed effects model that has been used widely in
the fungibility literature were complemented by models with a lagged dependent variable,
that solves dynamic misspecification, and instrumented aid, which accounts for endogeneity
problems. Aid in all specifications is found to be highly fungible in the short run and each
euro of aid results in approximately 20 cents increase of government expenditures. In the
long run, around half of aid replaces government expenditures. In groups of countries with
high aid GDP ratio aid is partially fungible, while in groups of countries with low share of
aid the hypothesis of full fungibility cannot be rejected.
7 Multilateral and bilateral aid
The extent of fungibility may differ for different types of aid. Many studies focus on sectoral
disaggregation of aid and found significant differences in the extent of fungibility. However,
to my knowledge no one has tested a major dimension of disaggregation: one into bilateral
and multilateral aid.
Ram(2003) notes 3 main differences between bilateral and multilateral aid:
17Chatterjee et al. (2007) do not include military expenditure in government spending since they are
“unlikely to be affected by the social and economic indicators included in the model”. Feyzioglu et al. (1998)
takes different approach, they include a neighboring country’s military expenditure as a proxy for a country’s
own defence expenditures.
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Donor motives – Economic and strategic interests are likely to be more important for
bilateral aid. For example, Todaro & Smith (2003) note that, starting with the Marshall
Plan, US aid closely followed changes in strategic points on the world map, switching its focus
to East Asia, Middle East or Latin America conditional on the geopolitical situation. Japan
concentrates its aid on East Asia, on the neighbouring economies that are also major recip-
ients of Japanese foreign direct investments and on major trade partners (Todaro & Smith,
2003; Ram, 2003). Great Britain and France allocate their aid in their former colonies, while
the OPEC supports Arab League countries (Boone, 1996). Berthelemy (2006) finds that all
donors (except for Switzerland) allocate more aid to their main trading partners and Younas
(2008) confirms this by stating that OECD countries allocate more aid to recipient nations
who import goods in which the donor nation has a comparative advantage in production. As
Alesina & Dollar (2000) summarize evidence for bilateral aid: “there is considerable evidence
that the direction of foreign aid is dictated as much by political and strategic considerations,
as by the economic needs and policy performance of the recipients. Colonial past and po-
litical alliances are major determinants of foreign aid” (page 33). Conversely, multilateral
aid seems to be more policy and poverty oriented (Dollar & Levin, 2006) and is allocated to
countries with good policies (Burnside & Dollar, 2000).
Aid conditionalities – Ram (2003) and Berthelemy (2006) point out that multilateral
and bilateral aid packages differ in the conditions attached. Multilateral institutions, like
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, have for a long time conditioned
their aid on so called structural adjustment and reform programs. Bilateral donors usually
did not use this type of requirement.
Closeness of the relationship between the donor and the recipient – Bilateral
donors often have long-lasting relationships with recipients (dating back to colonial times)
and therefore often have similar institutions, the same language, history of personal and
commercial interactions and country-specific knowledge. These factors may facilitate inter-
actions and lead to a better understanding of recipient’s needs (Ram, 2003 after Cassen &
associates, 1994). However, as has been argued (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Burnside & Dollar,
2000) multilateral institutions seem to pay more attention to the recipient’s needs than bi-
lateral donors. Furthermore, in the parallel literature on aid effectiveness, Ram (2003, 2004)
showed that when the constraint of the equality of bilateral and multilateral aid parameters
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Table 6: Results for bilateral and multilateral aid
Pooled OLS FE Pooled OLS FE GMM
Bil aid 0.213* 0.183* 0.060* 0.115** -0.221
(0.09) (0.08) (0.02) (0.04) (0.95)
Mul aid 0.526* 0.299* 0.109** 0.147** 0.887
(0.23) (0.12) (0.04) (0.05) (1.57)
L.Gov exp 0.876*** 0.627*** 0.761
(0.02) (0.03) (0.44)
GDP growth -0.204** -0.171** -0.070* -0.114* -0.780
(0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (1.10)
L.Infl 0.007 -0.005 -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.012
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
L.IMR -0.031 0.056* -0.006 0.024* 0.005
(0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.05)
L.Trade 0.078*** 0.028* 0.011*** 0.014 0.036
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
L.Agr VA -0.207*** 0.049 -0.032** 0.021 -0.106
(0.04) (0.07) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06)
Constant 26.397*** 47.027*** 5.091*** 17.406*** 7.699
(1.80) (1.69) (0.71) (2.09) (11.92)
F-stat 4.77 111.13 229.45 526.59
Obs 1369 1369 1309 1309 1305
Nr of instr 37
ABAR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.29 0.42
ABAR(2) 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.41 0.50
Sargan p-val 0.16
Hansen p-val 0.68
Equal coeff 0.24 0.51 0.37 0.71 0.67
βBIL ≤ 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.59
βBIL ≥ 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11
βMUL ≤ 0 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.29
βMUL ≥ 1 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.47
Dependent variable is the share of government expenditures in GDP (%). Mean equals 26.33%. Aid describes
share of aid in GDP (%). Year fixed effects included in all models, country fixed effects in fixed effects and
GMM models, both not presented. Newey-West standard errors used for pooled OLS and fixed effects model,
presented in parentheses. Two-step GMM system estimator using Windmeijer’s(2005) correction. GMM-
style instrument set both collapsed and lag limited to one lag. Sargan p-val and Hansen p-val show p-value
of Sargan and Hansen’s J-test on instrument validity, AB AR(1) and AB AR(2) show p-values for Arellano
and Bond’s (1991) test of first- and second-order serial correlation in the differenced residuals. L. denotes
lagged variable. Equal coeff. presents p-value of an F-test on equality of coefficients of Bil aid and Mul aid.
βBIL ≤ 0 and βMUL ≤ 0 are p-values for the test of full fungibility, βBIL ≥ 1 and βMUL ≥ 1 of no fungibility.
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
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is relaxed, both parameters are significant and sizeable, and have opposite signs. It may
suggest that the small and usually statistically insignificant impact of aid on growth can be
decomposed into two statistically significant effects: a strong positive effect of bilateral aid
which is offset by a strong negative effect of multilateral aid on growth.
The aforementioned reasons suggest important differences between bilateral and multi-
lateral aid, hence even at this level of aggregation the degree of fungibility may be different.
A priori it is not clear whether multilateral aid is more or less fungible than bilateral. As
was discussed in the introduction, one of the main reasons of fungibility are the conflicting
preferences between donors and recipients. There are arguments for multilateral aid being
less fungible. Under the (idealistic) assumption that governments care about pro-poor ac-
tions, since – as argued before – multilateral agencies seem to pay more attention to poverty,
one could expect small diversion of funds from multilateral agencies. Additionally, due to
attached conditions, that may require a recipient’s government own contribution multilateral
funds may be less likely to substitute government spending. However, Morrissey (2004) pro-
vides a review of the literature and points out that there is a consensus that aid conditionality
does not work, despite conditions attached governments do not undertake reforms required.
And if governments are planning to undertake the reforms, then imposing conditionality
may be unnecessary and sometimes even damaging.
Bilateral aid is also often used as a way to promote products from the donor’s country.
Tied aid packages18 (that satisfy all ODA requirements) require recipients to purchase goods
or services produced in the donor’s country. Around half of the aid channeled to the Least
Developed Countries is tied (OECD, 2001). It is being argued that tied aid tends to favor
projects that require capital intensive imports or donor-based technical cooperation instead
of smaller and more poverty-focused programmes, at the same time being 15-30% more
costly19 for the recipient than untied aid (OECD, 2001). On the sectoral level, if products
provided by the donor are not prioritized by the recipient, diversion of funds is very likely.
However, it is not clear what effect tied aid has on the aggregate level. If donors provide
products that would not be bought otherwise, then, paradoxically, aid should be non-fungible
since an optimizing government would allocate all other resources as if no aid was present.
18Definition of untied, partially untied, and tied aid in glossary (See Appendix A).
19Compared to the situation in which a recipient can purchase similar products or services at world prices.
Effectively, tied aid is a way to subsidize the donor’s domestic industry.
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Given the considerations presented above, the assumption of the equality of coefficients
of bilateral and multilateral aid is relaxed and equations (2) and (4) are estimated with
the same set of controls as the aggregated equation. To test for equality of coefficients of
bilateral and multilateral aid an F-test is used. Under the null hypothesis both coefficients
are equal, in which case the constraint is binding. Row Equal coeff. in the tables shows
p-values of this test.
The null hypothesis of equal coefficients cannot be rejected at the 10% level for any
specification (see Table 6). There are some small indications that bilateral aid may be more
fungible than multilateral aid for basic model and model with lagged dependent variable
(this result hold for other sets of coefficients, as well as for some subgroups). In the 5th
column aid and lagged government expenditures are instrumented. Neither the Sargan nor
the Hansen test raise any concerns regarding instrument validity. However, results become
statistically insignificant and very imprecise. Additionally, for the system GMM estimator
there is autocorrelation in residuals. Regression on subgroups confirm the findings. There
are small indications that multilateral aid is less fungible than bilateral aid for African
countries and countries with high share of aid, however when aid is instrumented results
become imprecise.
To sum up, there are only very small indications that substantial differences between both
components presented in the first part of the chapter may result in multilateral aid being less
fungible that bilateral aid. However, results may be biased if bilateral and multilateral aid
have different shares of off- and on-budget. The question of off-budget aid will be investigated
in the next section.
8 Off- and on-budget aid
The problem of the off-budget aid has been noted by Devarajan et al. (1999), Holmqvist
(2000), McGillivray & Morrissey (2000), and analyzed extensively by Van de Sijpe (2010).
Part of goods and services are provided by donors directly to final recipients (regions, sectors,
groups of people) and are not recorded in the recipient government’s budget. For example, a
training of the educational personnel can be organized directly by the foreign organization.
The presence of off-budget aid changes the way the fungibility coefficient should be
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interpreted. The left hand side of fungibility equations (1)-(4) – the share of government
expenditures in GDP – includes only on-budget aid, whereas aid that is on the right hand
side includes both on- and off-budget aid reported by donors. Therefore, by definition,
if off-budget aid is not accounted for, the fungibility coefficient is expected to be biased
downwards since off-budget aid is not directly increasing budget expenditure.20 Therefore, a
marginal effect smaller than 1 may be a result of the fact that part of the aid is not recorded
as government spending. Van de Sijpe (2010) shows in a simple analytical framework that
when off-budget aid is not accounted for, estimates of fungibility may be biased. Under
reasonable assumptions that off-budget spending is financed exclusively by off-budget aid
and that this type of aid cannot be diverted, non-divertible off-budget aid is fungible if it
results in a decrease of the government’s own spending (so when the coefficient next to off-
budget aid is smaller than 0). Similarly, interpretation of on-budget aid stays the same as
for previous models – aid is fungible if one euro of aid results in less than a one euro increase
in government spending.21
Van de Sijpe (2010) uses technical cooperation (TC) as a proxy for off-budget aid and
the value of sector programme aid as a proxy for on-budget aid and investigates fungibility
in health and educational sectors. Results for off-budget aid are robust and at most aid is
substituting a small part of own government expenditures. Results for on-budget aid are
not stable and no firm conclusion can be drawn.
Using Van de Sijpe’s (2010) methodology, I ask the question whether off-budget aid is
non-fungible at the aggregate level and whether not accounting for off-budget aid biases
fungibility estimated. Technical cooperation is used as a proxy for off-budget aid. In the
DAC2 OECD Table I am using – the data on sector programme aid are not available22
20Now, assuming that aid is not fungible, so that it does not change the way aid recipients spend their own
resources, then if all aid is channeled through the budget, one euro of aid increases government expenditures
by exactly one euro. However, when half of aid bypasses the budget, then one euro of aid increases government
spending only by 50% (so by the amount of on-budget aid), while the other 50% is not recorded in the budget.
If no distinction between off- and on-budget aid is made, the estimate of the fungibility coefficient (0.5) will
be biased downwards compared to true estimate that equals 1.
21Van de Sijpe (2010) also discusses previous studies in the context of off-budget aid. Those relying on
aid data provided by donors, i.e. among others McGillivray & Ouattara 2005; Osei et al. 2005; Pettersson
2007a,b, overestimate the extent of fungibility. That argument applies also to my analysis from the previous
section. However, there are studies (e.g. Pack & Pack, 1990, 1993) that used recipient-based aid data where
off-budget aid is treated as an omitted variable. Then, since usually on- and off-budget aid are correlated, the
estimate of fungibility of on-budget aid is biased unless the marginal effect of off-budget aid on government
expenditures is 0 (Van de Sijpe, 2010).
22OECD’s Credit Report System (CRS) includes data spent on ‘sector programme’. However, CRS dataset
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Table 7: Unweighted and weighted by GDP mean of on- and off-budget aid as a percentage
of aid-recipient’s country GDP
Total aid Bilateral aid Multilateral aid
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
On-budget 7.13 0.97 3.80 0.56 3.06 0.36
Off-budget 2.33 0.28 1.89 0.24 0.43 0.04
Total aid includes also aid from non-DAC countries
therefore the difference Total aid − technical cooperation is a proxy for on-budget aid. It
is, admittedly, an imperfect proxy since it includes the off-budget elements as well. Hence,
if indeed not accounting for off-budget aid decreases fungibility estimates, my results for
fungibility of on-budget aid should be treated as an upper bound.
Even approximated only by the TC, off budget aid is sizeable in the sample (see Table
7).23 Technical cooperation accounts for 25% of total aid. This share is even higher for
bilateral aid – 33%. The large share of off-budget aid indicates that previous estimates may
be substantially biased. When aid is aggregated, both off- and on-budget aid are statistically
significant at a 5% level for the two basic specifications. However, the interpretation of
coefficients is different. The estimate of the coefficient next to on-budget aid informs that
around 82% (88% for model with lagged dependent variable) of aid is fungible (for basic fixed
effect models), whereas the estimate for the off-budget aid suggests that when off-budget
aid increases by one euro, government expenditures increase by around 52 cents (21 cents).
Rather than fungibility, the flypaper effect is observed for these specifications.
When system GMM is used and aid is instrumented, estimates of the fungibility of on-
budget aid slightly increase, which means that aid is less fungible. However, estimates of
off-budget aid suggest that the null hypothesis of full fungibility cannot be rejected. Analysis
on subgroups presented in Table 9 provides additional evidence. Around 80-90% of on-budget
aid is fungible and the estimate is relatively stable, although not significant for all groups.
The estimate of off-budget aid is less precise, but suggests that off-budget aid is either fully
fungible or there is a flypaper effect (for results significant at a 5% level). 24
is incomplete (especially in the 1980’s and the early 1990’s) and requires a lot of data-mining.
23Due to my concerns about data quality and due to the fact that off budget aid accounts for a very small
(less than 0.5%) share of GDP, non-DAC members donations are not included in the analysis of disaggregated
aid.
24Off- and on-budget aid was further divided into bilateral and multilateral components. However, results
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Table 8: Results for off- and on-budget aid
Pooled OLS FE Pooled OLS FE GMM
Off-budget aid 0.756*** 0.520*** 0.067 0.209** 0.127
(0.19) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.25)
On-budget aid 0.229* 0.181*** 0.078*** 0.116*** 0.231**
(0.09) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.09)
L.Gov exp 0.877*** 0.620*** 0.627***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.15)
GDP growth -0.196** -0.169** -0.071* -0.114* -0.597
(0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.56)
L.Infl 0.009 -0.004 -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.008
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
L.IMR -0.026 0.057** -0.006 0.024* -0.006
(0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
L.Trade 0.074*** 0.029* 0.011*** 0.014 0.039*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
L.Agr VA -0.207*** 0.026 -0.030** 0.015 -0.099*
(0.04) (0.07) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant 26.504*** 47.061*** 5.054*** 17.750*** 10.952*
(1.78) (1.71) (0.73) (2.08) (4.62)
F-stat 5.62 133.47 227.41 524.17
Obs 1369 1369 1309 1309 1305
Nr of instr 37
ABAR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.31 0.03
ABAR(2) 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.44 0.45
Sargan p-val 0.89
Hansen p-val 0.94
βOFF ≥ 0 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.69 0.34
βOFF ≤ −1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
βON ≤ 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
βON ≥ 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
βLROFF 0.54 0.55 0.34
βLRON 0.63 0.31 0.62
Dependent variable is the share of government expenditures in GDP (%). Mean equals 26.33%. Aid describes
share of aid in GDP (%). Year fixed effects included in all models, country fixed effects in fixed effects and
GMM models, both not presented. Newey-West standard errors used for pooled OLS and fixed effects model,
presented in parentheses. Two-step GMM system estimator using Windmeijer’s(2005) correction. GMM-
style instrument set both collapsed and lag limited to one lag. Sargan p-val and Hansen p-val show p-value
of Sargan and Hansen’s J-test on instrument validity, AB AR(1) and AB AR(2) show p-values for Arellano
and Bond’s (1991) test of first- and second-order serial correlation in the differenced residuals. L. denotes
lagged variable. βOFF ≤ −1 and βON ≤ 0 are p-values for the test of full fungibility, βOFF ≥ 0 and βON ≥ 1
of no fungibility. βLROFF is the estimate of long-term fungibility of off-budget aid, β
LR
ON of on-budget aid.
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
are statistically insignificant and for IV and system GMM models not robust.
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Estimates of long-run fungibility are not precise, 31-62% of on-budget aid is fungible
while for off-budget aid there is a fly-paper effect and one euro of aid increases off-budget
and government spending by 1.34-1.55 euro.
Similarly to results presented in the previous two subsections, inclusion of a lagged de-
pendent variable solves the autocorrelation problem and the instruments pass the instrument
relevance tests.
In conclusion, while aid recorded in the budget turns out to be highly fungible, projects
that bypass the budget are usually non-fungible, which would be expected given theoretical
predictions. Also, as Van de Sijpe (2010) points out, recipient countries spend low amounts of
their own revenues on expenditures that can be classified as technical cooperation, therefore
substantial reduction that would offset inflows of aid is not possible.
Signs of the flypaper effect are a surprising result – previous considerations suggested
than when distinction for on- and off-budget aid is not accounted for, fungibility coefficients
are expected to have a downward bias. Unexpectedly, the opposite may be true and original
suspicion that the coefficient is underestimated because of wrong measurement may be dis-
missed. What can explain this finding? Aid illusion regarding off-budget aid may be present.
While governments are internalizing the expected size and arrival of on-budget aid and treat
it (to a large extent) as a substitute for government expenditures, information regarding
off-budget aid may not be available, hence there is no decrease of government spending.
Additionally, technical cooperation may be pushing for other types of expenditures. For ex-
ample, if doctors are taught how to do new diagnostic tests they may simultaneously increase
pressure on the government to provide required equipment.
9 Robustness
The aim of this section is to test the robustness of the main results. In the first part
multicollinearity is discussed, in the second part other specifications of the model are tested.
Roodman (2007) warns that regressions with collinearity can return statistically strong
results – multicollinear regressors result in small unique variance, however if this unique
variance is strongly correlated with the dependent variable, results significantly different
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Table 9: Results for off- and on-budget aid in subgroups
FE FE GMM FE FE GMM
Africa High Aid
Off-bud. 0.719** 0.053 0.058 Off-bud. 0.567*** 0.299*** 0.321
(0.23) (0.11) (0.47) (0.11) (0.07) (0.17)
On-bud. 0.153*** 0.118*** 0.282* On-bud. 0.154*** 0.119*** 0.248*
(0.04) (0.02) (0.13) (0.05) (0.02) (0.11)
L.Gov exp 0.622*** 0.572*** L.Gov exp 0.487**
(0.05) (0.12) (0.16)
Asia Low aid
Off-bud. -0.152 -0.031 2.126 Off-bud. -0.059 -0.326 -2.243
(0.35) (0.21) (1.28) (0.56) (0.27) (3.10)
On-bud. 0.221 0.185 -0.639 On-bud. 0.330** 0.097 0.985
(0.12) (0.10) (0.59) (0.12) (0.08) (1.31)
L.Gov exp 0.613*** 0.694** L.Gov exp 0.658***
(0.06) (0.23) (0.14)
Latin America
Off-bud. 1.349 0.57 -0.983
(0.69) (0.47) (1.16)
On-bud. 0.098 0.181 0.014
(0.09) (0.12) (0.24)
L.Gov exp 0.555*** 0.991***
(0.09)
Dependent variable is the share of government expenditures in GDP (%). Mean equals 26.33%. Aid describes
share of aid in GDP (%). Fixed country and year effects included in all models, not presented. Newey-West
standard errors used for fixed effects model, presented in parentheses. Two-step GMM system estimator
using Windmeijer’s(2005) correction. GMM-style instrument set both collapsed and lag limited to one lag.
The same controls as in all specifications used, coefficients not presented. Number of observations for models
with lagged dependent variable. L. denotes lagged variable. ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
from 0 will be found.25
Correlation between the share of bilateral and multilateral aid in GDP is 60% and it
varies between 40% and 60% for correlations between technical and non-technical cooperation
aid. As Ram (2003) notes, for a large sample such a collinearity should not be a problem.
Furthermore, the variance inflation factor (VIF) for projection of aid/GDP shares on other
variables found in the dataset used in the present study is almost always below 5, and only
25To illustrate, the author considers an example of a daily revenue of a shoe store. If an additional right
shoe is sold during the day of a particularly high revenue, the coefficient of the right shoe will be positive and
highly significant, whereas for left shoes negative, even though regression on either variable alone will report
little significance.
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in some specifications between 5 and 10, so in both cases below cut-off values proposed in
the literature. As noted before, highly correlated controls are excluded from the analysis.
In GMM system estimator instrument set was collapsed and limited to one lag. Even
though Hansen and Sargan tests did not rise any concerns regarding the validity of instru-
ments, some information might have been lost. To check the robustness of system estimator,
I keep the instrument set collapsed but include more lags. Results and all the properties of
the model remain the same when more lags are included for aggregated aid and for off- and
on-budget aid (see Table 10). The same is true when one step estimator is used. Addition-
ally, I check the robustness of results to limiting the number of instruments. Year dummies,
used to prevent cross-individual correlation, are excluded. It brings down the number of
instrument to around 10. Also in that case results are robust to changes, however Arellano-
Bond’s autocorrelation test shows signs of first order autocorrelation. As in the main part,
results are not stable for bilateral and multilateral aid (therefore those are not presented).
Data analysis showed that the share of aid in GDP varies substantially with country
characteristics. Smaller (in terms of population) countries receive significantly more aid in
relation to GDP than the most populous countries. Since in OLS or Fixed Effects models
the weight of small Solomon Islands of the population of 0.5 million people is the same as
weight of 155 million Nigeria, results may be driven by countries that receive tiny amounts of
aid in absolute terms. Then, the results of whole cross-country study may be biased towards
those small countries and hence less interesting for policy makers. To account for that, I use
Weighted Least Squares regression (with recipient’s and year’s fixed effects) as a robustness
check. Two weights (separately) are used: population and total GDP in constant dollars.
Estimates in all specifications remain the same, hence results are not driven by small or by
big countries or economies (results for regression weighted by total GDP in Table 11).
Additional robustness checks included limiting the sample to countries with at least 10
observations of government expenditures and using aid to GNI and government expenditures
to GNI ratios (instead of using the GDP in the denominator). Results are robust to these
changes.
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Table 10: Robustness of the system estimator
Aggregated aid
Two step estimator One step No year dummy
1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 1 lag 2 lags 1 lag 2 lags
Aid 0.206* 0.202* 0.204* 0.205* 0.202* 0.224* 0.229**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
L.Gov exp 0.627*** 0.644*** 0.637*** 0.632*** 0.639*** 0.638*** 0.604***
(0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (0.16) (0.13) (0.17) (0.15)
Obs 1305 1305 1305 1305 1305 1305 1305
Nr of instr 36 37 38 36 37 9 10
ABAR(1) 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.05
ABAR(2) 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.32 0.30
Sargan p-val 0.87 0.97 0.61 0.87 0.97 0.79 0.74
Hansen p-val 0.93 0.97 0.91 0.93 0.97 0.90 0.91
Off- and on-budget aid
Two step estimator One step No year dummy
1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 1 lag 2 lags 1 lag 2 lags
Off-budget aid 0.127 0.101 0.13 0.122 0.114 0.06 0.107
-(0.25) -(0.22) -(0.22) -(0.26) -(0.22) -(0.28) -(0.26)
On-budget aid 0.231** 0.237** 0.231** 0.232** 0.231* 0.276** 0.263**
-(0.09) -(0.09) -(0.09) -(0.09) -(0.09) -(0.11) -(0.09)
L.Gov. Exp. 0.627*** 0.642*** 0.631*** 0.630*** 0.638*** 0.629*** 0.602***
-(0.15) -(0.14) -(0.14) -(0.16) -(0.14) -(0.16) -(0.15)
Obs 1305 1305 1305 1305 1305 1305 1305
Nr of instr 36 37 38 36 37 9 10
ABAR(1) 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.05
ABAR(2) 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.32 0.30
Sargan p-val 0.87 0.97 0.61 0.87 0.97 0.79 0.74
Hansen p-val 0.93 0.97 0.91 0.93 0.97 0.90 0.91
Dependent variable is the share of government expenditures in GDP (%). Mean equals 26.33%. Aid describes
share of aid in GDP (%). Fixed country and the same controls included in all models, not presented. Year
fixed effects included in all models except for the model called ”No year dummy”, not presented. Lagged aid
used as an instrument for current aid in GMM. Two-step GMM system estimator using Windmeijer’s(2005)
correction. GMM-style instrument set both collapsed and lag limited to the number of lags specified at the
top of the table. Sargan p-val and Hansen p-val show p-value of Sargan and Hansen’s J-test on instrument
validity, AB AR(1) and AB AR(2) show p-values for Arellano and Bond’s (1991) test of first- and second-order
serial correlation in the differenced residuals. L. denotes lagged variable. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
10 Conclusions
This article presents new evidence on the issue of foreign aid fungibility. When aid is fungible
at the aggregate level it means that it either replaces government expenditures - enabling tax
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Table 11: Comparison of the fixed effects model and fixed effects results weighted by total
GDP in constant dollars.
FE Weighted FE Weighted FE Weighted
Aid 0.128*** 0.128***
(0.02) (0.02)
Bil aid 0.115** 0.116***
(0.04) (0.03)
Mul aid 0.147** 0.147**
(0.05) (0.05)
Off-budget aid 0.209** 0.208***
(0.08) (0.06)
On-budget aid 0.116*** 0.117***
(0.02) (0.02)
L.Gov exp 0.625*** 0.630*** 0.627*** 0.632*** 0.620*** 0.625***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Obs. 1309 1303 1309 1303 1309 1303
Dependent variable is the share of government expenditures in GDP (%). Mean equals 26.33%. Aid describes
share of aid in GDP (%). Fixed country and year effects and the same controls as in all models included, not
presented. L. denotes lagged variable. ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
decrease, decrease of borrowing needs or increase of government surplus - or that it is stolen
before it reaches the budget. It may also happen, that aid bypasses the recipient’s budget
and is directly distributed. This study makes three contributions to the existing literature
that focuses on short term fungibility.
Firstly, I reexamine the question of fungibility using a bigger and more balanced dataset
than other studies. To solve the problem of autocorrelation, the lagged dependent variable
is used. Endogeneity of aid is addressed in a system GMM model where the number of
instruments is limited by collapsing the instrument set and limiting the number of lags used
at the same time.
The results show that aid is highly fungible and around 80% of aid substitutes government
expenditures in the short run. However, there is a lot of heterogeneity in the sample.
Diversion of funds is lower when aid constitutes a large share of the aid-recipient’s GDP,
so among Least Developed Countries, mainly from Africa. In groups of countries where the
share of aid is low it is treated as additional revenue and the entire amount of aid is fungible.
Secondly, aid is disaggregated into a bilateral and a multilateral component and fungi-
bility of both parts is examined. To my knowledge this has not been done in the literature
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before. As Ram (2003, 2004) suggests the two types of aid differ in at least three respects:
(i) donor motives, (ii) aid conditionalities, and (iii) closeness of the relationship between the
donor and the recipient. Therefore, the restriction of the equality of coefficients is relaxed.
Weak evidence suggests that substantial differences between both components may result in
multilateral aid being less fungible than bilateral aid. However, results are volatile when aid
is instrumented.
Thirdly, I include off-budget aid into the analysis following Van de Sijpe (2010). When
off-budget aid is not accounted for, fungibility estimates may be biased. I use technical
cooperation as a proxy for off-budget aid, and treat the rest of aid as an (imperfect) proxy of
on-budget aid. As expected, on-budget aid is found to be partially fungible. The estimate of
off-budget for models that account for endogeneity is positive, but statistically insignificant,
which suggest non-fungibility of off-budget aid. Using a basic fixed effects specification a sur-
prising result is found - off-budget aid not only does not substitute government expenditures,
but it increases them.
Thanks to the inclusion of lagged dependent variable, it is possible to make a first attempt
to estimate long term impact of aid on government expenditures. Around half of aggregated
aid and on-budget aid is increasing government expenditures, whereas for off-budget aid
fly-paper effect is present.
As was noted in the introduction, fungibility is not necessarily a bad thing for develop-
ment. However, its existence rises question whether amounts spent on earmarking are not
wasted. The evidence shows that to a large extent aid is financing projects that would have
been undertaken anyway (also in the long run). As a solution, Devarajan & Swaroop (1998)
suggest that instead of financing particular sectors or programs, donors could use direct bud-
getary support conditional on an agreement about composition and quality of government
spending. However, if recipients are reluctant to have their whole budget scrutinized or
donors do not trust budget support, my analysis suggest two ways to decrease the extent of
fungibility: more aid could be channeled via multilateral organizations, which would proba-
bly also improve donor’s coordination, or more aid could bypass the budget since off-budget
aid is not fungible.
For future research, off-budget aid should be investigated in more depth, which requires
further data preparations. Creating more reliable proxies for off- and on-budget requires
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combining data on aid disbursement with OECD’s Credit Reporting System (CRS), taking
into account that CRS is not complete and that some types of projects may be both channeled
through budget or bypass the budget. Both my and Van de Sijpe’s (2010) analysis suggest
that when the presence of off-budget aid is ignored estimates may be biased.
More attention should be paid to proper sample selection. Fungibility seems to be a
heterogenous phenomenon and its extent differs significantly between groups of countries.
Hence, repeating older studies on a new, richer data sets, taking into account off-budget aid,
could shed new light on the extent of fungibility at the sectoral or regional level.
Roodman (2008) suggests that not enough attention is being paid to the question of en-
dogeneity of aid, and in a parallel literature on aid-growth relationships he shows that growth
is negatively Granger-causing aid. The same may be true for a link between government
spending and aid.
On a final note, the focus of the fungibility literature is on short term effect of aid. It is
tested whether one euro of aid increases government expenditures in a given year. However,
aid may have a long term effect on the level of government expenditures. Investment in
water sanitation may decrease water-related diseases and in the long term decrease health
spending and total government expenditures. Additionally, since aid is usually committed for
a longer period donators may be more interested in a long term impact of aid on government
spending. As has been noted before, estimation that uses 4 or 5 year averages may be a
superior way to asses medium and long term fungibility.
Appendix A: Basic definitions
The aim of this appendix is to provide definitions of basic terms and concepts used in the
study. The source of definitions is DAC Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts and OECD’s
Glossary of Statistical Terms (unless marked differently).
Official Development Assistance (ODA) - “Grants or loans to countries and territo-
ries on the DAC List of ODA Recipients (developing countries) and to multilateral agencies
which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development
and welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a
grant element of at least 25 per cent). In addition to financial flows, technical co-operation
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is included in aid. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. Transfer
payments to private individuals (e.g. pensions, reparations or insurance payouts) are in
general not counted.”
Bilateral aid - “Flows provided directly by a donor country to an aid recipient country.”
My measure of bilateral aid is limited to 24 official DAC members: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ire-
land, Japan, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Korea,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. As a robustness check
(see appendix 5), I also include data from the following non-DAC countries that report aid
disbursements and commitments to OECD: Chinese Taipei, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Es-
tonia, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Romania, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Arab
Emirates.
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) - “is one of the key forums in which
the major bilateral donors work together to increase the effectiveness of their common efforts
to support sustainable development. The DAC concentrates on how international develop-
ment co-operation contributes to the capacity of developing countries to participate in the
global economy and the capacity of people to overcome poverty and participate fully in their
societies.”
Disbursement - “The release of funds to or the purchase of goods or services for a recipient;
by extension, the amount thus spent. Disbursements record the actual international transfer
of financial resources, or of goods or services valued at the cost to the donor. In the case of
activities carried out in donor countries, such as training, administration or public awareness
programmes, disbursement is taken to have occurred when the funds have been transferred
to the service provider or the recipient. They may be recorded gross (the total amount
disbursed over a given accounting period) or net (the gross amount less any repayments of a
loan principal or recoveries on grants received during the same period). It can take several
years to disburse a commitment.”
Least Developed Countries - OECD uses a list of Least Developed Countries created by
the United Nations. The following criteria are applied by the Committee for Development
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Policy to identify LDCs 26
“(i) A low-income criterion, based on a three-year average estimate of the gross national
income (GNI) per capita (under $905 for inclusion, above $ 1,086 for graduation);
(ii) A human capital status criterion, involving a composite Human Assets Index (HAI)
based on indicators of: (a) nutrition: percentage of population undernourished; (b) health:
mortality rate for children aged five years or under; (c) education: the gross secondary school
enrolment ratio; and (d) adult literacy rate; and
(iii) An economic vulnerability criterion, involving a composite Economic Vulnerability Index
(EVI) based on indicators of: (a) population size; (b) remoteness; (c) merchandize export
concentration; (d) share of agriculture, forestry and fisheries in gross domestic product; (e)
homelessness owing to natural disasters; (f) instability of agricultural production; and (g)
instability of exports of goods and services.
To be added to the list, a country must satisfy all three criteria. In addition, since the
fundamental meaning of the LDC category, i.e. the recognition of structural handicaps,
excludes large economies, the population must not exceed 75 million. To become eligible
for graduation, a country must reach threshold levels for graduation for at least two of the
aforementioned three criteria, or its GNI per capita must exceed at least twice the threshold
level, and the likelihood that the level of GNI per capita is sustainable must be deemed
high.”
Least Developed Countries, other - Countries with GNI per capita below $935 not sat-
isfying other criteria (source: DAC List of ODA Recipients)
Lower Middle Income Countries and Territories - Countries with GNI between $936-
$3 705 (source: DAC List of ODA Recipients)
Multilateral agencies - “In DAC statistics, those international institutions with govern-
mental membership which conduct all or a significant part of their activities in favor of
development and aid recipient countries. They include multilateral development banks (e.g.
World Bank, regional development banks), United Nations agencies, and regional groupings
(e.g. certain European Union and Arab agencies). A contribution by a DAC member to
such an agency is deemed to be multilateral if it is pooled with other contributions and
disbursed at the discretion of the agency. Unless otherwise indicated, capital subscriptions
26From UN-OHRLLS website, accessed 7th of July, 2011.
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to multilateral development banks are presented on a deposit basis, i.e. in the amount and
as at the date of lodgment of the relevant letter of credit or other negotiable instrument.
Limited data are available on an encashment basis, i.e. at the date and in the amount of
each drawing made by the agency on letters or other instruments.” According to DAC2a
OECD table multilateral agencies that report aid disbursements (in some cases only com-
mitments) include: AfDB (African Dev. Bank), AfDF (African Dev. Fund), Arab Agencies,
AsDF (Asian Dev. Fund), CarDB (Caribbean Dev. Bank). Council of Europe, EBRD,
GEF, GAVI, Global Fund, IAEA, IBRD, IDA, IDB Spec. Fund, IFAD, IMF Trust Fund,
IMF (SAF, ESAF, PRGF), Montreal Protocol, Nordic Dev. Fund, UNAIDS, UNDP, UN-
ECE, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNRWA, UNTA, WFP, WHO, Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation
Untied aid - “Untied aid is Official Development Assistance for which the associated goods
and services may be fully and freely procured in substantially all countries.”
Technical cooperation - “Includes both (a) grants to nationals of aid recipient countries
receiving education or training at home or abroad, and (b) payments to consultants, advisers
and similar personnel as well as teachers and administrators serving in recipient countries
(including the cost of associated equipment). Assistance of this kind provided specifically
to facilitate the implementation of a capital project is included indistinguishably among
bilateral project and programme expenditures, and not separately identified as technical
co-operation in statistics of aggregate flows.”
Tied aid loans - “Bilateral loans that are linked to purchases of goods and services by the
debtor country from the creditor country.”
Tied aid credits - “Tied aid credits are official or officially supported loans, credits or
associated financing packages where procurement of the goods or services involved is limited
to the donor country or to a group of countries which does not include substantially all de-
veloping countries (or Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs)/New Independent
States (NIS) in transition).”
Partially untied aid - “Partially untied aid is Official Development Assistance (or official
aid) for which the associated goods and services must be procured in the donor country or
among a restricted group of other countries, which must however include substantially all
developing countries (substantially all Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs)
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Table 12: Data sources
code Description Source
GDP growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP WDI
GDP per capita GDP per capita, thousands constant 2005$, PPP WDI
Lit. rate Literacy rates, adults WDI
Agr VA Agricultural value added (% of GDP) WDI
Dep. Ratio Population aged 65 and above (% of total) WDI
Pop. Growth Population growth (annual %) WDI
Trade Sum of exports and imports of goods and services as
a share of GDP
WDI
IMR Infant Mortality Rate, both sexes IDB
Infl Yearly inflation rate IMF WEO
Population Total population IMF WEO
gov exp gdp Government expenditures as a share of GDP IMF WEO
GDP curr $ Gross Domestic Product in current prices, dollars IMF WEO
Aid Net ODA disbursement as a share of GDP OECD
DAC2a
Bil aid Net ODA disbursement from bilateral donors as a
share of GDP
OECD
DAC2a
Mul aid Net ODA disbursement from multilateral donors as a
share of GDP
OECD
DAC2a
Bil off-budget Net ODA disbursement for Technical Cooperation
from bilateral donors as a share of GDP
OECD
DAC2a
Mul off-budget Net ODA disbursement for Technical Cooperation
from multilateral donors as a share of GDP
OECD
DAC2a
Bil on-budget Difference between Bil and Bil off-budget
Mul on-budget Difference between Mul and Mul off-budget
and new independent states (NIS) in the case of official aid). Partially untied aid is subject
to the same disciplines as tied aid credits and associated financing.”
Appendix B: Data description
Table 12 presents a description of all the variables used in the paper and their source.
For government expenditure data, I would have preferred to use consolidated government ex-
penditures from the International Financial Statistics database of the IMF. However, since
this database contains many missing values, I decided to use WEO data which are more
complete, although they may be of lower quality. The FAQ section of the IMF is unclear
about the difference in quality and the exact differences between ISF and WEO data:
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”The data appearing in the World Economic Outlook are provided to the Research Depart-
ment at the time of the WEO exercise, not on a continual basis. The historical data and
forecasts are based on the information gathered by the IMF country desk officers in the
context of their missions to the countries and ongoing analysis of the evolving situation in
member countries; forecasts are staff estimates. The data published in the Statistics Depart-
ment’s International Financial Statistics are gathered as part of an ongoing data collection
effort, in which member country statistical agencies provide public statistics to the IMF.
Because of differences in data collection techniques, methodological issues, focus, and tim-
ing, the data in the International Financial Statistics and the World Economic Outlook may
differ.”(Source: WEO’s Frequently Asked Questions, accessed 15th of June, 2011)
The advantage of the DAC2a OECD table over the Creditor Reporting System (CRS), which
is used to measure sectoral fungibility, is that the former is supposed to be more complete,27
while CRS coverage for the 80’s and the 90’s is low. The DAC2a table contains data on
aid disbursement from bilateral and multilateral DAC members (list of DAC countries and
organizations in Appendix A under bilateral aid and multilateral aid). Additionally, the
DAC2a table also provides data on bilateral aid flows from non-DAC countries that volun-
tary agreed to report their disbursements and commitments to the OECD (list in appendix
1 under Bilateral aid). I exclude bilateral non-DAC aid due to the following reasons: (i) it
is not clear when the reporting process started and how complete the data are , (ii) in the
literature, only bilateral aid from DAC countries is used, (iii) the share of non-DAC aid in
aid-recipient’s GDP is very small compared to bilateral and multilateral DAC aid (only 3%
of total aid).
Arndt et al. (2010) argue (on the basis of information obtained from the OECD) that the
majority of missing values for aid represents in fact unreported null values. Therefore, I
replaced missing aid values by 0. This caused the sample size to increase by approximately
40 observations, but it did not have any impact on the results.
Since GDP data for China for the period 1998-2009 are missing, I replaced them by World
Bank data (for period 1980-1998 WEO and World Bank data on China’s GDP are very
27However, there are still some problems as noted (in an imprecise way) in OECD (2011): “While DAC
statistics include the outflows from all major multilateral organizations, there is still progress to be made.
Data coverage could be improved for UN specialized agencies and trust funds, and the accuracy of sectoral
information could be enhanced for a number of UN funds and programmes. The Secretariat is collaborating
with the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) in this respect”.
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Table 13: DAC List of ODA Recipient in 2009
Least Developed Countries Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Rep., Chad, Co-
moros, Dem. Rep. Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Er-
itrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiri-
bati, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives,
Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger,
Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Timor-
Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia
Other Low Income Countries
(per capita GNI < $935 in
2007)
Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Dem. Rep. of Korea, Kyr-
gyz Rep., Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Zimbabwe
Lower Middle Income Coun-
tries and Territories (per
capita GNI $936-$3 705 in
2007)
Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Cameroon, Cape Verde, China, Colombia,
Rep. of Congo, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El
Salvador, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Geor-
gia, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Jordan, Kosovo (1), Marshall Islands, Federated States
of Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia,
Nicaragua, Niue, Palestinian Administered Areas, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Sri, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Syria, Thai-
land, *Tokelau, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
*Wallis and Futuna
*Territory, (1) This does not imply any legal position of the OECD regarding Kosovo’s status.
similar). As a result of this replacement, China is included in the sample for all years (which
matters for the weighted averages).
Finally, although the infant mortality rate is also available in World Development Indicators
database, there are many missing values, which caused me to use U.S. Census Bureau’s
International Database (IDB) instead.
Appendix C: DAC List of ODA Recipients
Table 13 presents the full list of ODA Recipients for years 2009 and 2010. Due to miss-
ing variables, the following countries are excluded from the analysis: Burma, Haiti, Iraq,
Kiribati, Kosovo, Kyrgyz Republic, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Niue, North Korea, Sao
Tome and Principe, States Ex-Yugoslavia, Somalia, Timor-Leste, Tokelau, Tuvalu, Wallis
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and Futuna, West Bank, Zimbabwe.
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